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Office of the Governor
Dear Mr David:
In my letter to you of April 9, 2014, I quoted the report of Inspector Okpokpo that stated that on February 28, 2014 he had been informed by the management staff of the Village of Scarsdale that the condition of the roadway at issue involved only “some potholes along the roadway”. That description of the roadway was both untrue and consistent with the hostile attitude of the Village Manager towards the Labor Department, as shown by the events preceding February 28th.
On February 10th, 2014, Michael Paglialonga, Associate Attorney to Commissioner Rivera, before whom my complaint was pending, had advised Village Manager Gatta to “address the issues raised” by me concerning the unsafe condition of the library roadway. (See, Paglialonga letter of February 10th, 2014 attached. )
On February 19th, 2014, Village Manager Gatta gave Mr Paglialonga what is universally recognized as a middle-finger response to Mr Paglialonga and Commissioner Rivera. (See, attached, my two February 19th letters to Paglialonga and Gatta.)
Mr Gatta’s middle-finger of February 19th was still pointed at Mr Paglialonga 9 days later on February 28th when, in my opinion, the false description of the roadway was given to the Inspector.
Within the past week or so, to the astonishment of the Library employees and the residents of Scarsdale, Mr Gatta has been laying cement left and right on the length and width of the roadway whose condition he has concealed from the Labor Department at great risk to the men, women, and children of Scarsdale. When it came to disclosing the truth to Mr Paglialonga in answer to my charges about the unsafe roadway, Gatta withheld his hand and gave Mr Paglialonga his middle-finger.
The lesson is plain: You can game the Labor Law and the Penal Law by doing years later what you should have done years earlier. Rely on it: government employees will look at Gatta’s and the Mayor’s cover up with all of that cement and approvingly overlook the governmental immorality that lay underneath it, yet at a moral cost that involves all of us, for the lack of a firm governmental moral will that involves cement and roads will be there in all its negative strength when the issue is changing zoning to integrate our middle class brothers and sisters.
What has happened in Scarsdale should be criticized by Governor Cuomo’s administration in proof of his readiness to micro-manage local governments who take comfort in their belief that local governance is beyond his attention.
I thank you, Mr David, for the attention that you will give this matter.
April 9, 2014
Alphonso David State of New York Executive Chamber Albany, New York 12224
Dear Mr David:
In connection with your letter of March 28, 2014, I submit facts relevant to the Scarsdale Public Library matter in which you are inquiring on behalf of Governor Cuomo.
The “Intervention Form” executed by Inspector Benachi Okpokpo recites that on February 28, 2014 he walked around “the roadway leading to the Village library and interviewed “both management staff at the Village Hall and library employees. The interviews revealed that there were some potholes along the roadway to the library which was (sic) brought to the attention of the management at which point a local contractor was hired to temporarily repair the potholes until the weather temperature was consistent enough to allow for proper repaving of the roadway. The contractor patched the potholes but subsequent snow falls and plowing of the road caused a few of the potholes to re-appear. At this time no violations found (sic).”
Significantly, the Inspector’s report does not disclose what he saw when he walked “around the roadway”. His description of it depends wholly on Village management staff at the Village Hall and undescribed library employees. He was told that there were some potholes along the roadway which were temporarily patched by a contractor. The snow and plowing undid a few of the patched potholes.
More significantly, the Village management staff apparently did not provide the inspector with a copy of my January 31, 2014 letter to the inspector’s office which states that in September, 2014 I had filed with the Village, pursuant to law, a notice of the dangerous and unsafe condition that notoriously had existed for years in the rapidly deteriorating roadway, that in October the Village Manager’s office misled me by letter to believe that the dangerous condition of the roadway had been corrected, and that thereafter, on December 3rd, I visited the roadway and saw that nothing had been done to change its grossly unsafe condition of which I took about 33 photographs copies of which were given to the Scarsdale Inquirer. The road was as unsafe as it was on September 13th, the date of the notice of defect received by the Village. My offering of copies of those photographs to the Village Mayor was met by silence. Should you desire to see them I will send the set of photographs to you. If they prove anything, they prove that the inspector was led by the Village staff up the yellow brick road. If the inspector had read my complaint in the January 31st letter on file in his office, he would have seen that it alleged my possession of the 33 photographs showing the defective condition of the road. He could have compared the photographs to the roadway described by the Village staff. Further, I believe that the Village records may contain claims by two library employees of personal injuries sustained by them in their use of the library road. If that is so, the inspector might have learned of them had he inquired of the village management or indeed of the library employees.
What was the condition of the library road on December 9 when the Village Manager emailed the Mayor concerning it? The Village management staff did not show that letter to the Inspector. In it the Village Manager stated to the Mayor, “We paved it about 10 years ago, but it is in bad shape now.”, surely a hands down entrant for the understatement of the century.
Last, the Village management staff did not disclose to the Inspector the history of this wrestling match with a Village Board that consciously endangered its residents for a substantial period solely to withhold the payment of its cost until the adoption of the next budget. Thus my above letter of January 31, 2014 to the inspector’s office stated (Italics added):
“The Board’s and Village Manager’s subsequent answers to my written protest against the unsafe work condition of the librarians and their assistants is that these workers must await the Spring when a new budget may be adopted, this the answer from those who for years have knowingly failed to provide in their budgets for the correction of the scandalously deteriorating condition of the roadway. However, the duty of the Village to make the road safe is an immediate one. The duty is absolute and unconditional. It is not discretionary. The Labor Law of New York knows of no delay when life or limbs are at stake.”
As that letter of January 31st painstakingly pointed out, there is an issue of criminality in the Board’s making of that choice. I enclose a copy of the January 31st letter.
I thank Governor Cuomo for his interest in a matter small compared to his major concerns. The roadway is small, the library employees who supported my claims are not numerous, and the legal issues will not fix the public’s attention. Yet, Governor Cuomo has seen to it that an inquiry should be made into whether what occurred here in a small village reflected a standard of governance with which he is becoming identified.
December 22, 2013
Commissioner Peter M. Rivera New York State Department Labor State Office Campus Building 12, Room 506
Albany, NY 12240
Dear Commissioner Rivera:
Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-g and Village Law § 4-402(g), a notice of defect was filed with the Village Clerk of Scarsdale on September 13, 2013, informing the Village of the dangerous, defective and unsafe condition that has notoriously existed for years in the rapidly deteriorating roadway located at and abutting the Scarsdale Public Library at 54 Olmsted Road, the only village road that extends to the entrance of the library.
By a letter of October 25, 2013, from the Village Manager’s Office, I was led to believe that the unsafe condition of the roadway described in the September 13th notice of defect had been corrected.
On December 3rd, 2013, I visited the roadway and saw that nothing was done to change its grossly unsafe condition of which I took about 33 photographs. The road was as unsafe as it was on September 13th, the date of the notice of defect received by the Village. The Board of Trustees, who by law possess and control the Village’s roads, would not tolerate in front of the Village Hall a roadway as unsafe as that in front of the library, yet that is the condition in which the librarians and their assistants are made to work, for the only means of access into the library, by day or more dangerously at night, is by walking across the road in front of it.
The Board’s and Village Manager’s subsequent answers to my protest against the outrageously unsafe work condition of the librarians and their assistants is that these workers must await the Spring when a new budget may be voted on and the road newly paved, a heartless answer from those who for years have knowingly failed to deal with the notoriously deteriorating condition of the roadway.
The Board’s and Village Manager’s answers that the library workers must run the risk of substantial injury or death until a budget may be voted on is as illegal as one can imagine, for the duty of the Village to make the road safe is an immediate one. The duty is not a discretionary one. Morally considered it is repugnant coming as it does from one of the wealthiest communities in the United States to hardworking women probably hesitant to speak out and thus in some way endanger their employment.
Labor Law § 200
The failure of the Village to correct the condition of its roadway justifies this complaint to the Attorney General and the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor that the Village has violated, and continues to violate, Labor Law § 200 by failing to provide the employees of the library with a safe place in which to work by compelling them to walk over the defective, unsafe roadway as their sole means of access to their work in the library . See, Zito v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 259 AD 2d 1015 (4th Dept. 1999), leave to appeal dismissed, 93 NY 2d 999; cf., Moore v. Suburban Fuel Oil Service, Inc., 22 AD2d 827 (2d Dept. 1964), order aff’d, 16 NY2d 647 (1965).
Labor Law § 200(2) provides, in effect, that if any area to which the Labor Law applies is in a dangerous condition, the labor commissioner may post a notice in such area which shall “prohibit further work in or occupancy of such area until the dangerous condition is corrected*** ”. Further, Labor Law § 200(3) provides that the Attorney General may institute a proceeding to enjoin further work or occupancy of that area. Accordingly, if the Village fails to provide the required safe work place for the librarians, the closing of the library is well within the reach of the Labor Law.
Penal Law §§ 15.o5(4), 125.10, 195(2)
The refusal to make the roadway safe arguably makes the Board and Village Manager chargeable at this time with the violation of Penal Law § 195 (2) which provides that a public servant is guilty of official misconduct, punishable by a term of one year, when, “with intent to obtain a benefit or deprive another person of a benefit, he knowingly refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.”
The Board and the Village Manager have the factual knowledge and the lawful duty which, together with evidence of injury or loss of life traceable to the dangerous condition of the roadway, would put them at risk to prosecution for assault with criminal negligence (Penal Law § 15.05(4)) and assault with recklessness, to say nothing of the felonies of criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law § 125.10) and second degree reckless manslaughter.
In defense against the criminal charges, it is insufficient , except in an asylum, to assert, as the Village Manager has done, that the correction of the road’s unsafe condition should await the adoption in the Spring of the next budget, presumably when the softer earth can more readily accept the burial of children or their parents or the librarians who fell on the library road in the Winter.
Attorney at Law
Letter to Japan Today , a noteworthy publication in Japan, from Harry Reynolds, Attorney at Law
My Dear Innocent Japanese Brothers,
We in the United States have sent you Donald Duck as our ambassador to your country. She describes herself as a practicing attorney though she never practiced a day as a lawyer. Indeed, she is registered as a lawyer in New York City at an address of a design business owned by her husband. Professionals in our diplomatic service have derided her appointment. Every responsible journalist in the United States regards her as an intellectual invalid whose command of English ranges from zero to minus zero. When proposed as an ambassador to your country, she was on the verge of being suspended from the practice of law for having repeatedly failed to register as an attorney, a simple process that required, among other things, her affirming under oath that she had not, as an attorney, unlawfully taken the property of any person. Her sole, in your face claim, to any public office, including her ambassadorship to Japan, is that she is the daughter of an assassinated President and hence has key to any position to which she arrogantly deems herself entitled.
If I were Chinese and intent on asserting rights to a fly zone over waters near Japan, I would make every effort to challenge Donald Duck to discuss those issues in a televised conference, one that American and Japanese citizens can witness while throwing up uncontrollably.
Harry Reynolds, Scarsdale, NY
Histories are often made by events which, slow in the making, pass by us when we are not looking and later stun us by the magnitude of their meaning. The sunny day of June 20th, 2013, was such a day, the place the Supreme Court, and the occasion Justice Scalia’s report of the opinion in American Express v Italian Colors, a case involving credit cards, arbitration claims, the waiver of class actions, and the Sherman Act, enough to draw into a deep sleep any workman passing the courthouse. He would not suspect that Justice Scalia was changing the ground rules of our society by in effect protecting corporations from the detection of their violation of federal statutes.
It was the work of a corporate attorney never to draft an arbitration clause without positioning the arbitration clause, like a chess piece, next to a class action waiver. In the attorney’s tool kit, the deceptive adhesion contract was the rope, the arbitration itself lay in waiting, and the class action waiver was the knot in the rope, all this in a democracy boastful of a free market for its unemployed who are rarely informed of the arbitration clause nestled in the printed employment form that they, out of work, gratefully sign. House counsel took care to include the class action waiver, for without it his CEO’s fate in a class action could be that of dancing across a floor 24/7 with a one-legged flamenco dancer.
On the other side of the dance floor was the class action lawyer whose ideal was the pot of gold awarded not to the members of the class, who commonly hold low-value claims, but to him whose take, so to speak, depends on the aggregate number of the members of the class. He sometimes thinks himself, on the way to the bank, as a private prosecutor, a quasi-attorney general, shadow of the old time Pinkerton agent acting in the public interest. However, if he presses weak claims in class actions, the renouned Judge Richard Posner entertains a different fantasy about him. Judge Posner, a soft spoken realist, sees a class action alleging weak claims as an attempt to blackmail defendants into the Hobson’s choice of either settling or rolling the dice.
And rare is the class action lawyer who wants for members of a class. Consider how arbitration clauses have sprung up:
By 1991, more employees were covered by arbitration clauses than by collective bargaining agreements. Arbitration clauses were thoughtfully included by employers in personnel manuals, lenders put them in credit card agreements, nurses tendered them in hospital medical consent forms, like wild weeds they sprouted in purchase agreements and service contracts.
By 2003, nearly one quarter of private nonunion workers were subject to arbitration systems imposed as a condition of employment.
By 2009, 75 percent of major consumer transactions were subject to mandatory binding arbitration.
In 2010, arbitration was mandatory in agreements of the 4 largest cell phone companies, 5 out of the 8 largest cable companies, 6 out of 9 major credit card companies, and 2 out of 4 national retail banks. All required the waiver of the right to bring a class action.
By 2011, 93% of the most prominent firms in the credit and financial services industries had arbitration clauses in their employment contracts.
By 2012, more than 50% of the largest retail banks and credit unions had arbitration agreements for individual checking account customers.
If the class action lawyer feels a debt to anyone it is to the genius who thought to take arbitration from the courts who disliked it, and to enshrine it in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) where it must have been greeted as if it were a bride. What greater gift for the tired businessman than the knowledge that, if a dispute involves a contract with an arbitration clause, the Federal Arbitration Act provides that the court must stay litigation so that the dispute can go to arbitration and, after the arbitration is completed, the Act gives extremely limited power to the courts to review the award no matter how erroneous it might be.
Prior to American Express, the Supreme Court found in 2011 that the Arbitration Act favored the enforcement of class waivers in arbitration agreements. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1750-51 (2011). On the other hand, class action lawers took comfort from the conviction that the court had in 1985 in the Mitsubishi Motors case provided a way around that wall in the so called “ vindication principle” which barred an arbitration clause if it prevented the vindication of federal statutory rights. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
In American Express, retail merchants signed contracts that provided that they must accept both AmEx charge and credit cards. The contracts contained arbitration clauses coupled with class action waivers. In their class action, the merchants claimed that AmEx violated the Sherman Act by the use of its monopoly power in the credit card market to force the merchants into an unlawful tying arrangement involving the credit and charge cards. As for their waiver, they argued that the waiver prevented them from asserting federal antitrust claims the individual litigation of which was prohibitively expensive. The district court sustained the waiver but the Second Circuit reversed, holding a class action the economical route for the merchants to proceed in the light of recent rulings of the Supreme Court.
In reversing with what was probably unconcealed enthusiasm, Scalia, J., when finished with his autopsy, left little of the class action for use in arbitrations, a result foreshadowed by his opinion in AT&T Mobility LL.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct.1740 (1211). He upheld the class action waiver because (1) there was no congressional command requiring the rejection of the waiver, (2) proof was lacking that Congress approved Rule 23 as an entitlement of class proceedings for the vindication of statutory rights, (3) the respondents individually, but not as a class, had their rights to secure the vindication of their federal rights, and (4) as for the respondents lack of money to pay for the prosecuting of their individual antitrust claims, Justice Scalia ice-skated away with the statement that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim”, words right out of Dickens. Indeed, right out of the courthouse window went the “vindication principle”.
Justice Scalia did not address the fact that, on the papers before him, there was arguable proof that American Express may have been in criminal violation of the Sherman Act and that the consequence of the court’s opinion, in effect, was the protection of American Express from the inquiry and overhauling that the class action lawyers would have given it. Reading the opinion, one is left with a sense of shame, a sense of having witnessed something wrongful.
In dissent, Justice Kagan to no avail unsuccessfully argued primarily that the arbitration clause, by barring a class action by the respondent merchants, prevented the effective vindication of federal statutory rights.
However much one may imagine attempts to evade American Express, it ultimately falls to Congress to say whether and in what contexts it favors contractual freedom in arbitration agreements over the private enforcement of federal statutes or, to put it more pointedly, whether it has the moral will to resist the pressure of moneyed interests over the public welfare, for business interests are active even now in our wonderful Capitol to resist changes in the law of arbitration. They must have read with relief Justice Scalia’s scuttling of the vindication principle.
What do scholars foresee in American Express? They see “the destruction of protection for collective action that has been at the heart of the labor laws for over sixty years. It will require employees and consumers to arbitrate their federal statutory rights even when, to paraphrase Justice Kagan, they have been given an adhesive contract that effectively deprived them of all legal recourse.” Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbitration Under the Labor Law, 61 UCLA L. Rev. Disc. 164, 179 (2013) [Upon which I drew for the data concerning the widespread use of arbitration agreements, supra.]
Having delivered the bad news, here is the good news:
Section 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to report to Congress concerning the use of arbitration in consumer transactions and to “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of…arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers”. Should the agency issue regulations prohibiting the use of class action waivers in consumer financial products, the law that now favors the enforcement of class waivers in arbitration agreements would be flipped for those contracts over which the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has direct authority. However, if the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau bans class action waivers in consumer financial contracts, its rule will apply, pursuant to a grandfather clause, only to contracts entered into more than 180 days after the rule is issued. During that period, the sun will be blotted out by crisply printed class action waivers.
Harold Reynolds, Attorney at Law, Scarsdale, NY
November 18, 2013
Caroline Kennedy’s 800 Pound Gorilla at the OCA
By Harry Reynolds
When there’s an 800 pound gorilla in the waiting room at the OCA, how do they handle it?
Since 1982, the Judiciary Law, § 468-a, requires every New York attorney to file every two years a registration statement with the Office of Court Administration (OCA).
Caroline Kennedy, admitted to the bar in 1990, did not file two recent registration statements with the OCA and accordingly twice invoked the law’s provision that her defaults constituted “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and shall be referred [by the Office of Court Administration] to the appropriate appellate division of the supreme court for disciplinary action” which could include suspension from the practice of law. (Emphasis added.)
The purpose of the registration statement is not only the collection of a fee. Its purpose includes the attorney’s affirmance, in substance, that the attorney has not stolen his client’s money or other property.
Caroline Kennedy by her defaults failed, among other things, to affirm that she had not stolen client’s money or other property.
Contrary to the mandate of Judiciary Law, §468-a, the OCA, without any authorization in law, and in violation of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge who oversees the OCA, twice did not refer Ms Kennedy’s defaults to the Appellate Division for disciplinary action. Instead, OCA recorded her failures to file registration statements by listing her as “Delinquent”, a procedure wholly without any basis in Judiciary Law §468-a, or the Rules of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals or the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge.
OCA’s record describing Ms Kennedy as “Delinquent” was published by it on May 2d, 2013 when my comment concerning Ms Kennedy was published by The New York Times in connection with Michael Shear’s column about the vetting of proposed appointees of the President:
“HarryReynolds Scarsdale, New York
It would be prudent for the President to inquire into why Ms Kennedy is listed as “Delinquent” in the public records of the New York State Office of Court Administration because she has failed to file one or more registration statements which include her affirmation, in substance, that she has maintained her financial records as an attorney in accordance with the rules of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
In short, as in the case of every attorney who registers, an answer must be given to the question whether Ms Kennedy has unlawfully taken or used moneys entrusted to her as an attorney.
Her failure to file requires the Office of Court Administration to refer her to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for disciplinary action which could include her suspension from the practice of law for conduct hindering the administration of justice.
Further, the prospect of Ms Kennedy’s appointment at a time of critical tension with North Korea must have politicians in both parties wondering about the President’s judgment. What would he do if Ms Kennedy, after her appointment, were suspended from the practice of law for conduct hindering the administration of law? Would he laugh and tell the Japanese jokes while they look closely at him for any sign of imbalance?”
On the following day, May 3rd, 2013, the Office of Court Administration, contrary to Judiciary Law §468-a, and without any lawful authorization of the Chief Administrative Judge or the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, and without any published explanation by Caroline Kennedy, changed the published registration status of Caroline Kennedy to “Currently registered” when in law she was in default for years and her case should have been transferred to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court “for disciplinary action” as provided by law.
Could this be true? Was the “Delinquent” Caroline Kennedy rehabilitated at night and woke up on May 3rd as registered and free of a review of her defaults by the Appellate Division? Are we watching an old Shirley Temple movie? Indeed, as bonus is she free of making up for all of those more than forty hours of Continuing Legal Education credits that she had not sat through like the rest of the attorneys down in the tween decks? What happened to Judiciary Law, §468-a? The OCA would do well to publish the miraculous registration statement signed by Ms Kennedy upon which they presumably rely for its making of the unlawful change to the public record. The statement didn’t exist for years before May 3rd, 2013, according to the OCA’s listing of her as “Delinquent” during that period.
New Yorkers aren’t Jack and Jane Bimbos. They know quick change artists when they see them.
The action of the OCA in the Kennedy case raises the question whether the OCA is open to its subjection to political uses by its unlawful policy of not referring to the Appellate Division lawyers who default in their obligation to file registration statements. We ask OCA now for the number of these lawyers and the number of the two-year periods attributable to each of them, for some may not have reported for as many as six or eight years, which brings us to the matter of Congressman Charles Rangel.
Congressman Charles Rangel failed to comply with the registration statute between its enactment in 1982 and 2007, an Olympic leap of a quarter-century that would excite any pedestrian’s admiration for its length. He suddenly became registered in or about 2007 after what must have been a unique discussion with the OCA. The OCA disposed of his default without sending it to the Appellate Division as required by Judiciary Law, §468-a. He may have had a good defense, but it was one determinable only by the Appellate Division under §468-a and, in any case, the OCA does not have any judicial powers.
What does one in New York do when there is an 800 pound gorilla in the OCA’s waiting room and the smell of garbage in the air?
One should call upon Governor Cuomo and Attorney General Eric Schneiderman both of whom have declared their intention to rid New York of governmental corruption.
Invite them to start here with the 800 pound gorilla in the waiting room at the Office of Court Administration.
Attorney at Law
May 10, 2013
“Of 6,310 US War Dead, 39 Were Jewish”
by Harry Reynolds
The Forward, the nation’s premier weekly Jewish newspaper, front-paged in its February 18, 2011 issue an article, Profiles of Our Fallen, the opening statements of which were:
“Later this year, the United States will mark the 10th anniversary of its military involvement in Afghanistan. March 20 will mark the eighth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq. The Department of Defense reports that as of February 7, 5775 members of the U.S. armed forces have been killed in these theaters of war. American Jews make up only a fraction of these casualties – by a reliable count, 37 men and women who lost their lives in combat.”
In its editorial in the same issue, the Forward states:
“In the Jewish community, there is often more focus on those Americans who enlist in the Israel Defense Forces than those who have chosen to fight under the stars and stripes.It’s an unspoken, uncomfortable truth: the IDF is the Jewish military. About 650 of the “lone soldiers” currently serving in the IDF are dual American-Israeli citizens****.”.
“By contrast, of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, only 1,500 are Jewish, 1% of the total currently deployed there.”
In its editorial of November 11, 2011, the Forward stated:
“As of this writing, 4,482 American servicemen and women have died in Iraq, and 1,828 in Afghanistan, according to the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count. That brings the total to 6,310 lost lives. Jews are a tiny portion of America’s military, the number of Jewish deaths smaller still, but that’s no excuse for our general amnesia. Some synagogues call out the names of the dead before their congregations recite the mourner’s Kaddish, and veterans groups try to remind us to remember.
“Does anyone really believe that is enough?”
What facts, if any, may be inferred from these figures published by the Forward? Would those facts incite anti-Semites? If so, what is to be gained by publishing them?